

TAB D

**ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
OF AN  
ATTEMPTED COUP IN ALBANIA**

**ADVANTAGES**

1. If successful, would;
  - a. Cause world-wide loss of USSR prestige.
  - b. Cause slight improvement in Western Military position in Balkans, with corresponding loss to Soviets (involving primarily Sasan (Saseno) Island naval base at mouth of Adriatic).
  - c. Provide an additional base for clandestine operations into Yugoslavia and Greece.
  - d. Demonstrate to vacillating and neutral nations that West is capable of offensive action in cold war and imply that further offensives will be forthcoming.
  - e. Raise morale amongst satellite peoples, strengthen will to resist Communism, and increase cooperation with Western covert services.
  - f. Intimidate satellite government officials.
  - g. With proper PP exploitation, re-emphasize to populations of non-Iron Curtain countries the puppet nature of satellite governments and the overwhelming anti-Communist convictions of satellite populations - thus strengthening popular Western resistance to Communist blandishments.
  - h. If sponsored by US-UK or US-UK-Yugoslav, would avoid possible future Balkan conflict or wrangling resulting from unilateral Yugoslav-inspired coup and avoid probable loss of U.S. prestige resulting from failure to capitalize on covert investment in Albania.
  - i. Allow diversion to other projects of funds now allocated to BOGFIEND.

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**2. Whether successful or not, would:**

- a. Wrest initiative from Soviets and force them to operate in a theater presumably not of their own choosing.
- b. Possibly serve as an operational test to determine true nature of Tito-Soviet relations.
- c. Divert Soviet attention from more strategic areas.
- d. Provide all U.S. agencies engaged in coup with valuable experience in conducting operation to overthrow a satellite government.

**DISADVANTAGES**

- 1. Probably provoke retaliatory Soviet aggression elsewhere (e.g., Berlin, Iran, Indo-China).
- 2. Possible risk of starting World War III inadvertently, by placing USSR in position she feels she cannot accept.
- 3. Severe propaganda defeat if coup unsuccessful, particularly if West identified as backers.
- 4. Loss of confidence in U.S. leadership by European allies if known, suspected or intimated that U.S. had a hand in upsetting precarious peace in Balkans - particularly if coup is unsuccessful.
- 5. Risk of provoking local Balkan war between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (only country with which Albania has mutual assistance pact).
- 6. Propaganda ammunition provided USSR if Yugoslavia dominates new Albanian government.
- 7. Risk, after successful coup, of subsequently losing Albania to Soviets if Yugoslavia returns to Cominform, resulting in loss of prestige to U.S.
- 8. Economic drain on West, after liberation, and small economic gain to USSR.
- 9. Probably intensify Russia's war preparations.
- 10. Probably intensify Russia's psychological warfare campaign.

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